| The next case
to be considered is Jones v. United States. I wish to put off discussion
of the academic debate between the Pope and Jones case until we look at
the Jones analysis. |
|
| The appellant was found guilty of involuntary
manslaughter. Now the question is not whether the trial court was
right in finding that the baby had died as a result of the defendant's
failure to act; but rather whether that failure established an actus reus
under the law? Is this an instance where omission -- failure to act
-- is sufficient to meet the requirement of an act under the criminal law?
Note that this goes to defendant's appeal. She is challenging the
trial court's alleged failure to instruct the jury on the necessity of
finding a legal duty to act on the part of the defendant before it can
find her guilty. |
|
| The court then goes on to speak of
the four situations under the common law when there is a duty to act: 1)
by statute; 2) by status; 3) by contract; and 4)by assumption of care of
a helpless person. Be sure you note situation four and that you understand
it. Would housemate where a baby is located be an analogous situation
as to those mentioned in footnote 9 on page 191?? Why or why not? |
|
| Also beware that what legally constitutes
assumption of care is a tricky issue. In Regina v Stone (page 194),
the court concluded that the evidence of the defendants attempting to locate
Fanny's doctor and to wash her was sufficient to establish that they had
assumed care given that Fanny lived in their home. The general rule
here is, that once you assume care, you are lible for consequences of failing
to take reasonable steps to aid. Note footnote 10 on Second Restatement
of Torts. |
|
| Note that the government argues instead
for situation 3 or 4 which as the court points out involves factual questions.
What would those facts be?? What does it mean when the court says
the case is reversed and remanded? |
|
| Code: Note that the code takes a similar
position in § 2.01(3). |
|
| The Debate |
| How Much Help Should be Required.
Note that one court has held that one needs to take that amount of action
which is "reasonable calculated to achieve success" in aiding the third
party (on that ground it found a mother guilty of child abuse). |
| On What criteria do we determine
a duty exists? In Beardsley, a manslaughter conviction of a man
who failed to get medical aid for his lover was reversed on the ground
that he had no duty to aid. Would this decision seem to be correct
under Jones? If the decision bothers you, how would you formulate
the rule in this situation? And again, how much aid would be required? |
|
| One argument against establishing a
general duty to aid is that the criminal law is about preventing us from
doing harm and not about requiring us to do good. Does this distinction
between commission and omission seem to accord with our common sense? |
|
| On page 188, the author sugesst that
a distinction should be drawn between"harm-producing omissions" such as
where an official fails to warn traveller's that the river is too high
to ford, and those omissions where harm cannot be directly connected to
the failure to act (such as not giving a begger alms). What is logically
distinct is acting to cause harm and failing to give a benefit. But
is it not true that failing to give a benefit often contributes to harm? |
|
The Minority Position
Do the statutes of Vermont and Rhode Island seem to draw the lines correctly
between when one must help and the degree of help that must be offered?
(page 190) |
