Specific and General Intent The concepts of specific and general intent are from the common law and frequently are not used in statutory schemes.  In one context, specific intent refers to an additional purpose such as assault with intent to kill.  The intent to kill element makes the crimes one of specific intent.   Another understanding of specific intent is when a crime has a mens rea of knowledge or purpose.  In this case, the state must prove the actual knowledge or knowledge + desire (purpose) to do the proscribed act such as bigamy or rape for there is no culpable state without the knowledge.  If one thinks he has consent, he does not (in his mind) engage in an act of forcible relations, i.e. rape. United States v. Neiswender is a great case for studying the nuances of specific and general intent.  The defendant was convicted of obstruction of justice which requires that one "endevors" to impede or influence a trial.  In Code terms or under the common law, what is the mens rea implied in the word endevor?  Note the specific intent embodied in that mens rea.  To be guilty of the crime there must be proof that one consciously aimed to impede the administration of justice.

Jesse James

The problem in this case is that there was no proof that the defendant had ever had contact with a juror which would establish the mens rea.  The only proven contact was with the defense lawyer.  Did the defendant seek to impede to defense lawyer???

Hence the defendant appeals his conviction saying only fraud was proven, but not the mens rea for obstruction.  Note the rule the court adopts.  To prove specific intent in an obstruction case, it is only necessary to show that defendant had knowledge that obstruction was likely rather than to aim (purpose) to obstruct.  The court continued that knowledge was proved by looking to the "natural and probable" consequences of one's act and the forseeability of those consequences to the defendant.

Does this court keep with the oridnary meaning of endevor? So too, given the specific facts of this case, is it the natural and probable consequence that a defense attorney who thinks he has paid off a juror would be less earnest in his defense?

It is worth the time to take a look at Note, A funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Courthouse, 67 N.Y.U.L. Rev 570 (1992) as the casebook suggests to really get a grasp on the problems in this case in regard to the mens rea issue.

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