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Law
as Rhetoric
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James Boyd White
starts out by suggesting that the doing of law is not the doing of a science
but of an art. Precisely the art of Rhetoric. The first question
then is what does it mean to call law a "science," and what art is the
art of rhetoric. |
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| Professor
White gives an answer to law as a science. Law is about determinate rules
(written fixed text, legally constituted by correct procedures).
This concept of law is a system which speaks of substantive rules as opposed
to procedural rules, or primary rules as opposed to secondary rules.
We have rules of construction which gives us a plain meaning and simply
subsume facts under a given rule. The rule is a rule because it is
based upon authority. Is this true?? |
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| So too, under
what Professor White calls the new tradition of institutional sociology,
we see law as any system of institutionally established and managed rules
which need not have any particular ethical content to be called a law.
The word managed is key here for it is assumed today that law serves ends
by manipulating its objects -- us -- through the use of incentives
or disincentives. Law becomes, in then end policy choices which the
legislator makes, the court enforces or not, and the attorney indifferently
defends or not, all in service of some further aim outside the law itself.
be it equality, more friendly law for insurance companies, attempts to
end racism, or control of reckless drivers. |
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Finally law as
a science is said to deal with proofs of truths which of course entails
an understanding of both deductive and inductive logic.
it is thought
if you learn the legal science of deducing, interpreting, and finding rules,
you can do law in a value free scientific kind of way. |
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| Against this,
Professor White speaks of law as the doing of rhetoric. It is, often referred
to as the art of persuasion of what is probably true (and given this classic
definition, you see immediately that doing rhetoric is the art of legal
argumentation guided and framed by various evidence rules that deal with
relevancy -- probability). It does so, it is said, by evoking the
emotions of the listener and hence is a manipulative art. |
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| Instead, Professor
White speaks of rhetoric as constitutive. Law is, he says an activity,
not a thing out there we look up in a book. Pause upon this. He points
out that the mode of analogical thinking that allows one attorney to see
the relevancy of a certain case to his case whereas the opponent discounts
it shows as that law is always a creative act of argumentation with meaning
being uncertain. So too, however, the attorney must always
take account of opposition. |
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| Hence she modifies
her argument, includes a bit, rearranges an interpretation to accommodate
objection. She "does" law. In doing this most importantly,
the attorney is always speaking ethically, about what kind of community
we should be for the call to some notion of the just, or right, is implicit
in the language he must trust in to persuade another be it judge or jury. |
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| It follows from
the above, that we know law is always culturally situated, historically
specific. The attorney tells a story (this is what happened,
this is its meaning, this is its plot) which naturally refers to meanings,
and implications, sensibilities, and modes of understanding prevalent in
the culture and which yield the "story" its cogency. Hence
the example of fishing and what it may mean. Insofar as we do this
art of rhetoric, says Professor White, we are constituting ourselves, constituting
a community. |
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| Now when two
come together to fish, or to argue a case, or to argue a case to a listener
who will render judgment, there is an implicit question about the
meaning f what they do, or say, together or as adversaries. At what
point is there enough shared meaning that they can say "we"? For
example, two opposing attorneys still each each other as a member in the
same profession for they recognize modes of argument, of ways of dealing
with each other, of informal and formal relations, that says "we" |
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| The making up
of a breach -- which the law is fundamentally about be it civil or criminal
law -- is the coming into being of a shared meaning for the past and a
for a common future. The attorney in the end, is acting to help resolve,
to reestablish community by persuading a listener of the essential meaning
of an event (or rule) which will end -- resolve -- a dispute. |
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| There are several
implications about law, some explicit and others implicit in Professor
White's article. First, he reminds us that rhetorical language is
concrete, for it seeks to unveil an idea or argument to the listener who
it must remembered is human. This means nestled in a world of ethics,
repulsions, distastes -- meaning. He is gentle in dismissing
value free language. |
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| Second, I wish
to bypass his numbered suggestions for reasons I will clarify later in
the course. But as to a generalization from them the most important is
to ask when reading a text, or indeed listening is to attempt to comprehend
what is intelligible in what is said, and why its is intelligible. What
sort of world is presupposed? |
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Rhetoric
as Art
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| I asked you to
read the second article so you could place all of this discussion about
rhetoric within the context of why you even have a law and literature class.
As professor Barron again points out, there are those who see law as a
science and those who see law as an art of rhetoric. Now, in the
latter group you often get critical thinkers who tend to think that upon
discovering that law is an art, its then all a sham and a deception.
I do not hold with this. In addition she says there are those
who teach law and literature who tend to see law itself as arid and thereby
needing the softening hand of literature. In short, the need for
emotion to be brought to the mechanical, logical and indifferent task of
doing law. I also do not hold with the school of thought that see
law, proper, as arid. Rather we will follow this route beginning
with a couple of easy propositions:
First
if Law is the doing of rhetoric and rhetoric is an art than law is art.
Put differently, it may be (or as we will explore in this class), that
justice is about the beauty of an argument, or an action rather than about
whether it is "right or wrong." Now in theology this is an old old
thought, for when we contemplate the Divine as a perfect being, we are
contemplating it as a beauteous being. So too, when we attempt to
reconcile perfection with "rightness" we become confused for one meaning
of perfect (and hence beauty) in without exclusion. Perfection, or
divinity is all, in perfect fittedness. This of course includes evil. |
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| Now to say justice
is about the beautiful is not to say that law is a sham meaning that we
persuade by well spoken words that hide basically our hobbesian wants and
drives and not a shred of virtue or aspiration to a concept of the good.
Rather, it is to say this, our second proposition: |
| If justice is
beauty, then it is closely connected to form (and hence all of your classes
that deal with procedure or argumentation) rather than substance (or the
actual bottom line rule). Now we know already that justice is about
proper form rather than the substance of an action. Consider history
and Sherman's march into Georgia. He may or may not have been right
to fight on the side of the union. But that is not how we judge him
historically. Rather the issue is how he fought -- his form.
He was vicious, cruel, lacking in respect for his enemy. We judge him harshly.
But so too, we know this in our profession. We do not judge a judicial
opinion by its holding, but by its reasoning. Is it consistent, cogent.
Does one point follow from another. Does it take account of opposing
arguments and strive to reconcile perhaps divergent case law? In
short we judge it by its form -- its shape -- its loveliness and elegance. |
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| This then is
the central idea this course will explore. How is it that justice
partakes of beauty? (note that the just is always beautiful, but the beautiful
is not always just, hence the lesson of Lucifer as the great deceiver).
In answering that question keep in mind certain canons or rules of aesthetic.
Proportion, harmony, composition, but most importantly the yoking together
of seeming polarities into a unified whole. Hence we speak of positive
and negative space in painting. Or in sculpture such as Michaelanglo's
Pieta we speak of the life and movement contained in a lifeless piece of
marble. |
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| In Henry V, we
will discover many polarities and the question for us is what does this
text, this work of art, teach us about the nature of justice. The
issue is not so much the "tale" or the right or wrong of various actions.
Rather the thing is to discover the tensions, name them, and see how they
are resolved. NOW, grappling with the text requires discerning
the rhetorical community of Henry V's world and engaging with it.
Ask yourself how this text represents constitutive rhetoric, or the doing
of law, as Professor White speaks about it although (as you will see) there
are no clear answers about right or wrong in any of the events that take
place. |
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